The file-sharing literature has focused mainly on whether file-sharing has decreased record sales, with less attention paid to the size of any decline. Although there is still some contention, most studies have concluded that filesharing has decreased record sales. What has not been noted is that most estimates indicate that the file-sharing has caused the entire enormous decline in record sales that has occurred over the last decade. This heretofore hidden result is due to the lack of a consistent metric that would allow easy comparability across studies. The task of this paper is to provide such a metric, translate the results reported in the literature into that metric, and then summarizes the results from this exercise.
How much of the highly publicized decade-long decline in the sales of authorized sound recordings is due to file-sharing? Although it is generally accepted that a large majority of empirical studies have found that file-sharing has caused a decline in the sales of prerecorded music, it is difficult for someone reading this literature to find a useful summary of the empirical estimates of the decline caused by file-sharing that might provide an answer to this question. This difficulty is due, in large part, to the different metrics of sales decline used in these studies as well as their use of differing empirical methodologies, different time periods and different geographic regions.
Although several articles, such as Connolly and Krueger (2005) , DeJean (2009), Liebowitz (2005) , and Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009), offer lengthy literature reviews, most of them, as well as the many obligatory reviews that are contained in studies of file-sharing, are generally focused mainly or entirely on the sign of the results-i.e., whether file-sharing has a negative impact on the sales of sound recordings. That focus may have made sense when the debate was largely about whether file-sharing had any negative effect at all on the sales of sound recordings. Nevertheless, the size of the estimated piracyinduced declines is of interest in and of itself and should be of greater interest than the sign, in part because the size of a coefficient contains more information than its sign, and also because the policy implications of filesharing are likely dependent on the size of the estimates.
The purposes of this paper are threefold. First, it is to show that differences in the metric chosen to report the effect of file-sharing lead to important differences in the information conveyed. Second, it is to identify a metric that directly informs legal and economic consideration of the consequences of file sharing regardless of the time period or the countries used in the analysis. The final goal is to convert the estimates found in the literature into this metric so as to provide a meaningful comparison of the estimated size of file-sharing's impact on record sales. The metric that I use for this comparison is defined as the share of the sales decline that is due to file sharing over some period of time.
As I show below, when the results of these studies are made comparable in this manner, the estimates from a majority of studies imply that that file-sharing has caused the entire decline in sound recording sales that has occurred since the ascendance of Napster. 1 I believe this finding is likely to surprise even those who have been keeping up with this literature, since the prevalence of this result seems not to have been previously noted.
I. Candidate Metrics
Most econometric examinations of the issue tend to perform a regression of the form:
(1) = + + where RS stands for record sales, FS stands for file-sharing and Z is a vector of covariates that are thought to influence record sales. 2 These regressions can be run across geographic regions, individuals, or albums, at a moment in time or as a time-varying panel. The coefficient b, which would be negative if filesharing decreases record sales, represents the extent to which a downloaded song or album replaces the sale of that song or album.
There are at least three potential metrics of a decline in sales that might be proposed.
The most common method of measuring the impact of file-sharing is to create an estimate of the size of the decline in sales that is caused by file-sharing and then form a ratio of this decline as a percentage of overall sales:
Although this is a natural measure and the one most commonly adopted by researchers in the field, it does not allow comparability with other studies using the same measure, in spite of the fact that it is easy to simply compare percentage changes as a matter of arithmetic. The problem with comparing these percentages is that they will change not only as the amount of filesharing changes but also as the closeness of the substitutability between 2 In most instances there is no direct measure of file-sharing. Instead, a proxy, such as Internet usage, is often used. This may overstate the impact of organized file-sharing because other uses of the Internet that might reduce record sales (such as exchanging music files using email) cannot be separated from the impact of programs allowing organized and anonymous file-sharing. The results for these studies should probably be understood either to include a wider aspect of sharing files than organized file-sharing systems, or else to indicate an estimated result that is biased upward. Using the Internet, particularly for other forms of entertainment, might also usurp a user's time that would otherwise be used listening to music, causing a different upward bias in the estimated impact of file-sharing, although Liebowitz (2008) has estimated this bias to be quite small. originals and unauthorized copies, which is a function of the technology in use by consumers. 3 This means that the same degree of file-sharing by the same people at different points in time will have different values for metric 1. This metric will also vary across countries and populations, for the same reasons.
A second metric could be coefficient b from the above equation: Rob and Waldfogel, in their 2006 article, are the only authors of whom I am aware that use this particular measure which they label as the "displacement rate." This metric looks at the share of downloaded music that replaces the sale of music ("We find that each album download reduces purchases by about .2 in our sample, although possibly by much more" 4 ). The problem with this measure is that translating it into an actual decrease in sales requires knowing how large the illicit download market is relative to the legitimate market. So the .2 reduction found by Rob and Waldfogel (2006) would imply a 20% reduction in sales if the legitimate and illicit markets were the same size but would imply a 40% reduction if the illicit market were twice as large as the legitimate market. 5 The ratio of the sizes of the licit to the illicit market is likely to differ across countries and over time, increasing the complexity of comparisons. It is perhaps for this reason that this metric is so uncommon among the papers on file sharing.
The most striking statistics in the sound recording industry, post-Napster, is the enormous decline in sales, as indicated in Table 1 . A common question asked by many industry analysts is the extent to which the current decadelong decline has been caused by file-sharing. Answering this question provides 3 The substitutability between originals and copies depends on how easy it is for unauthorized mp3 files to be played on the same audio devices and in the same locations as the legitimate purchased music that was available on CDs. In the early days of file-sharing MP3 files could not be played on most audio systems and converting MP3 files into the WAV files found on CDs required a CD burner which many users did not yet own. Over time, CD and DVD players gained the ability to play MP3 files, CD burners became commonplace, and MP3 players, such as the iPod, became the centerpiece of home and auto audio systems although the timing differed by country. These advances in technology increasingly made illicit downloads better substitutes for purchased originals. 4 This statement is taken from the abstract of Rob and Waldfogel (2006) . 5 Liebowitz (2006) discusses various estimates of the relative size of the illicit download market (FS) relative to the legitimate market (RS) and concludes that the estimates of relative size are wildly disparate and that many estimates of the illicit market indicate that it is considerably larger than the legitimate market.
the third candidate metric for the impact of file-sharing: the share of any given decline that is due to file-sharing. This can be represented as:
This third metric has the advantage of allowing comparisons over time and across regions. For example, as illicitly downloaded files become better substitutes for legitimate versions (because of the growth of MP3 players, say), both the decline in legitimate sales and the decline in sales due to file-sharing will become larger even if the amount of file-sharing were to remain constant. But if the only reason for the decline in sales were file-sharing, then Metric 3 will remain unchanged at a value of 1, indicating that the role of file-sharing in causing the decline has not changed. This is particularly useful in comparing the decline across countries which will experience different diffusions of technologies that influence the substitutability of illicit and legitimate files.
This metric has problems in specific circumstances, however. For example, filesharing could be harming sales but sales could still be growing. In this case it would be very awkward and probably meaningless to try to use Metric 3 to compare the estimated impacts of file-sharing over time since it would not even be possible to define the share of the decline that was due to file-sharing if there was no decline in sales. 6 Table 1 indicates the size of the decline in the U.S., in both units and real revenues and real revenues for the non-U.S. portion of the world (labeled "non-U.S."). 7 Fortunately, U.S. and worldwide record sales have fallen in an almost monotonic fashion since the appearance of Napster. Further, Liebowitz (2007) provides evidence that each of the top markets has experienced a severe decline in sales so that Metric 3 can be used for the markets that have been empirically examined by economists. 6 One might generalize this to try to account for a decline from any trendline, not just zero. If the actual growth of sales fell below trend, then even with an increase in sales it would be reasonable to consider the deviation from trend as lost sales and we could then examine the fraction of lost sales, measured in this way, that is due to file sharing. However, because those lost sales are conjectural, I have not recommended that approach here. Nevertheless, as we will see below, it is not unreasonable to encounter an effect of file-sharing that exceeds 100% of the observed decline in legitimate sales, implying that an upward trendline would have continued if not for file-sharing. 7 The U.S. data on unit sales come from the RIAA website. Revenue statistics, both for the U.S. and non-U.S., come from the IFPI document "2010 Recording Industry in Numbers." Values for the non-U.S. portion of the world are dominated by the dozen or so leading markets. Table 1 also shows that unit declines are slightly less in the U.S. than are revenue declines (columns 1 and 2), indicating a small fall in prices since 1999.
The non-U.S. revenues (column 3) decline more slowly in the first few years but then catch up and surpass U.S. losses by 2004, although the U.S. losses become larger again in 2008.
Because of the ease of comparisons across time and geographies, and because Metric 3 directly answers the question as to the importance of file-sharing in the recent industry decline, Metric 3 will be the one I choose as the common denominator with which to compare all results. With this metric chosen as the common denominator, comparisons can be made across the various types of studies to see how similar or dissimilar the results are from one another. First, however, I wish to illustrate how mixing different metrics has led to unfortunate confusion in the literature.
II. Some Inconsistent Uses in the Literature
Regrettably, there are in the literature some inconsistent nomenclatures regarding metrics measuring the impact of file-sharing. For example, Rob and Waldfogel are not the only economists to use the term "displacement rate" when discussing possible metrics for the impact of file-sharing on sales.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009), which intends to be a summary of the literature, also uses the term "displacement rate" but its use of the term is different from that of Rob and Waldfogel. Further, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, although they have a specific definition of "displacement rate," do not use it consistently when addressing the literature. Here is portion of a paragraph from Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009) that illustrates multiple inconsistent uses of the term that make the comparisons uninformative:
The majority of studies find that file sharing reduces sales, with estimated displacement rates ranging from 3.5% for movies (Rob and Waldfogel, 2007) to rates as high as 30% for music . …Liebowitz (2008)… reports a displacement rate of more than 100% for a selection of U.S. music markets…A typical estimate is a displacement rate of about 20%. One implication of these results is that developments other than file sharing must have had a profound impact on sales…Rob and Waldfogel (2006) find an average displacement effect of 20%. 8 [My italics]
The first usage of "displacement rate" in the above quote mentions both a 3.5% value from Rob and Waldfogel (2007) and a 30% value from . The 3.5% figure (for video) used in the Rob and Waldfogel article is an instance of Metric 1, a measure of reduced video sales due to file-sharing (although overall video sales actually increased), whereas Zentner's 30% figure measures the reduced probability of purchasing music and does not fit into any of the three metrics presented above. 9 Although comparing estimated values for movies with estimated values for music might seem a questionable exercise, comparing two completely different metrics to supposedly provide a useful range of estimates is a far more serious error.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf's next usage of the term "displacement rate" concerns Liebowitz (2008) who used Metric 3 in his article, or the share of the decline in music sales due to file-sharing. The third usage of the term found in the quoted paragraph concerns a "typical" estimated displacement rate of 20% that Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf claim to have derived in some manner. Interestingly, the metric that Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf claim to be using appears to be Metric 3. For example, in the sentence following this third usage they suggest that a rate of 20% implies that other factors must have had "a profound impact on sales" which is a logical implication only if they are using Metric 3 (among the metrics discussed) because it would imply that 80% of the decline would be due to something other than file-sharing. Further, a few pages 8 See Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009) page 35. I have included a portion of their footnote 17 in the text of the quoted paragraph placed where the footnote occurred. 9 In their abstract (page 379), Rob and Waldfogel state "Our analysis indicates that unpaid consumption, which makes up 5.2 per cent of movie viewing in our sample, reduced paid consumption in our sample by 3.5 per cent." Zentner states in his abstract on page 63: "The results suggest that peer-to-peer usage reduces the probability of buying music by 30 percent." He then creates a "back of the envelope" metric equivalent to Metric 1 (having a value of approximately 8%) that he suggests is more informative.
before the above copied quote (page 20), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf summarize their results by stating "…many studies conclude that music piracy can perhaps explain as much as one-fifth of the recent decline in industry sales" (my italics). Given that in the next sentence they then refer to this decline as a "displacement" and that the amount is identical to the 20% "typical value" found in the paragraph reproduced above, it seems clear that their term "displacement rate" is supposed to measure the extent to which piracy can explain the recent decline in sales, or in other words, Metric 3. At least it would seem clear, except for the fact that they use the term "displacement rate" in so many incompatible ways.
Their final usage of the term "displacement rate" (labeled a displacement "effect") in that paragraph refers to results from the same Rob and Waldfogel (2006) article which I discussed as the leading, and perhaps only, example of Metric 2. Thus Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf use four different and incompatible metrics as examples of "displacement rate" within this single paragraph. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "typical" 20% figure suggested by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf will be seen to bear no relationship to the actual average displacement where displacement is consistently defined as the share of the decline due to file-sharing (Metric 3).
Notice how much this confusion about the metric can affect the message. If file sharing caused a 20% decline in sales (Metric 1), that would likely be a very large share of the sales decline in the years shortly after Napster's introduction. By conflating the metrics used, however, an observed decline of 20 percent of sales might be reported as a "20% displacement" (defined as Metric 3), leaving the reader with the impression that the actual sales reduction due to filesharing was quite small relative to the overall decline, with other factors playing a much larger roll. Unfortunately, this is exactly the presentation made by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf that leaves the reader with the impression that the impact of file-sharing is smaller than it actually was estimated to be.
III. Applying the Metric to the Literature
The point of this section is to compare the results of papers finding that filesharing caused harm (in the next section I discuss papers that do not find harm). The published papers of which I am aware are Hong (2007, forthcoming) , Liebowitz (2006 Liebowitz ( , 2008 , Michel (2006) , Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) , Rob and Waldfogel (2006) , Waldfogel (2010) and . Two unpublished papers of seemingly similar quality to those that are published are and .
In order to compare the results of these papers to one another, I translate the amount of file-sharing-induced decline that these papers find into a percentage of the decline in sound recording sales that had occurred at the time of their measurement. Naturally, there is going to be some imprecision within many of these original estimates and that imprecision will necessarily carry over to the translated results. For one thing, many of these papers have multiple point estimates. In such cases, I take the one preferred by the authors when their preference seems justified, or, if none is listed as 'preferred' I use the average of the proffered estimates. Even with just a single point estimate, however, these papers use different years and different countries for their analyses and Table  1 makes clear that there are differences in sales declines depending on which years and which countries are used as the basis of analysis. Also, there are confidence intervals around the point estimates, although I ignore those in this analysis. Table 2 lists alphabetically the results from ten published articles (listed first) and two unpublished studies (listed last) finding some degree of harm due to file-sharing (the details of the calculations underlying Table 2 are found in the Appendix). Seven of these studies have results indicating that the entire decline in sales is due to file-sharing. Another study has two results, with one of those results consistent with the full decline being due to file-sharing and the other result about a third of the decline. Two other studies indicate that file-sharing is responsible for either about half or two thirds of the decline and one study finds the smallest result, between 20% and 40% of the decline. 10 It is clear that the average of these studies is not the 20% "typical estimate" claimed by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf since only one of the twelve studies has a result as low as 20%. 10 The reader should be aware that Professor Hong, in his forthcoming article prefers a result of 20% although he found an overall result of 40% trying to control for compositional changes in his data. His preference for the 20% value is based in large part on the fact that when he subdivides his population data into cohorts, some of the coefficients are statistically insignificant even though their values still imply an overall 40% decline. He chooses to set these insignificant coefficients to zero, thus lowering the overall impact to 20%. But having less than typical statistical confidence in a result does not imply that a result of zero is more appropriate than the measured coefficient. Thus I list both numbers. In summary, and allocating partial results from studies with mixed results, 7.5 of the 12 studies find that file-sharing explains the entire decline. 11 The average estimated value of Metric 3, for the other 4.5 studies that do not find that the entire decline is due to file-sharing, is 50% of the decline. When the raw numbers from all these studies (found in the Appendix) are averaged, the mean value of Metric 3 is slightly over 100%, further indicating that filesharing has been estimated to be responsible for more than the entire decline in sales.
The Metric 3 values greater than 100% probably need a word of explanation. Many of the studies have Metric 3 values of greater than 100% and as seen in the Appendix, some values are as high as 200%. A value this large may seem odd at first glance, but such a seemingly high number is not necessarily unreasonable once properly understood. This is best illustrated through the use of a simple example. 11 Professor Hong, in correspondence, suggested that his 2007 result not be given equal consideration to those from his forthcoming paper because he did not try to control for compositional changes in his 2007 paper (although his 2007 paper appears to be the later paper). Because he has not withdrawn or repudiated his 2007 paper, however, and because we cannot know whether he has truly been successful in controlling for compositional changes in his forthcoming paper (he uses propensity scores and not actual variables on individual characteristics), I include the paper in Table 2 . Even if his 2007 paper were removed from the Table, however, it would merely lower the share of papers finding that the entire decline was due to file-sharing from 63% (7.5/12) to 59% (6.5/11). Also, the average value of Metric 3 for all papers would still be over 100%.
Example: Assume that a firm sells 10 CDs in year 0, whereupon file-sharing begins. By year 5, sales have dropped to 8 CDs, a 20% decline. Assume as well that in the absence of file-sharing that sales would have increased by 4% per year, leading to counterfactual sales in year 5 of 12.17 units. The apparent decline, the one reported by the record companies and appearing in RIAAtype statistics, is 2 units (10-8) . The actual decline, determined from a perfect econometric examination, is 4.17 units (12.17-8) .
Metric 3 would state that 208% of the measured decline was due to file-sharing (4.17/2). This is close to what Liebowitz (2008) found, where a counterfactual growth rate of 3.6% was sufficient to explain his Metric 3 result of 200%. A sound recording yearly growth rate of 3.6% in the U.S. was a very typical growth rate during the three decades prior to the advent of file-sharing, indicating that a value of 200% for Metric 3 is well within the realm of reasonableness.
The results from a majority of studies-that file-sharing is responsible for the entire decline in sales-is also consistent with the evidence from proposed alternative hypotheses to explain the decline in sound recording sales. Liebowitz (2004) and Liebowitz (2006) carefully examined these alternative explanations and found that they were largely lacking in empirical support, and the intervening years have only strengthened that conclusion. 12 With no support for other possible explanations of the decline in record sales, logical consistency would lead to a conclusion that file-sharing must be responsible for the entire decline, which is what the majority of economic studies have found, once the proper metrics are used.
IV. What about the papers that do not find harm?
There are no published articles in academic journals that find a positive impact of file-sharing on sound recording sales, although there is a study (Andersen and Frenz, 2007) , conducted for a Canadian Ministry, which concludes that file-sharing has a positive impact on sound recording sales. 13 The two published studies that do not find that file-sharing harms sales are Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and a revised version of the Canadian government study using the original data, Andersen and Frenz (2010) . Obviously, when studies find no impact of file-sharing on sound recording sales there is no need to discuss metrics, since all of the metrics will be zero.
This short list of papers with benign results may appear rather puzzling to those who have read the literature review in Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009), because Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf provided a considerably longer list of studies with zero or positive impacts of file-sharing. For example, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf claim that "[w]hile the majority of papers reports some sales displacement, the four studies using actual measures of file sharing find that file sharing is unrelated to changes in sales" and the Andersen and Frenz study is not even included in this group. The studies that Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf reference in this quote (in addition to their own 2007 article) are: Bhattacharjee et al., (2007) , Tanaka (2004), and Smith and Telang (2010) . The reader may ask why I am not including these three studies in the list of studies not finding harm from file-sharing. A few words are in order.
First, I did not include Bhattacharjee et al., (2007) because that paper does not conclude that the impact of file-sharing on sales is benign. This is not just my interpretation of the paper. Here is Dr. Bhattacharjee describing his results:
"It is not correct to say that our work shows file sharing is unrelated to changes in sales," said the Management Science paper's lead author, Sudip Bhattacharjee, in an e-mail message to The Chronicle. "The paper did not look directly at sales, only at chart longevity, also known as chart survival." And "we did report a decrease in survival over all" said Mr. Bhattacharjee… [Glenn 2010 ]. 13 I do not consider the results found in the 2007 report of Andersen and Frenz (2007) to be plausible. This report estimated that each illicitly downloaded song increased sales by slightly less than half a unit (.44). If extrapolated to the economy, this estimate implies that if filesharing had not existed, there would have been no sales of prerecorded music in Canada at all, a completely unbelievable notion. Further, this estimation was run for only those individuals in the sample who engaged in file-sharing. When the full sample, including both downloaders and non-downloaders was used, the result was that file-sharing hurt record sales by an amount about equal in size (but the opposite sign) to their favored result.
Second, I chose to exclude Tanaka (2004) from the list not because it is a working paper but because the paper is very clearly not a completed working paper. Tanaka reports the paper as version "0.1". His conclusion begins "This research is very preliminary because we have not yet tried sufficient instrumental variables." Since his main econometric technique is based on instrumental variables and he does not discuss the properties of the instruments that he uses, this appears to be a major problem. Finally, Dr. Tanaka has stated in correspondence that his paper will never be finished nor submitted to a journal whereas the two unpublished papers listed in Table 2 have both been completed and submitted to journals. I invite readers to examine Dr. Tanaka's paper and judge for themselves.
Finally, I leave Smith and Telang (2010) out of the current analysis because that paper attempts to measure the impact of file-sharing on video sales of older movies when they are rebroadcast on television. Because the literature that I examine in this paper is focused on audio, not video, and on the overall impact of file-sharing, not a partial impact on one non-current segment of the market, the Smith and Telang result, interesting though it might be, did not seem relevant.
Therefore, the only one of the four studies listed by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf as finding a benign impact of file-sharing on record sales while using actual measures of file-sharing, is Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), a paper that I consider to be unreliable in many ways. 14 Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf list one more paper, Gopal and Bhattacharjee (2006) , as finding a positive impact of file-sharing on record sales but I believe they have misread this paper's conclusions. 15 Thus, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Andersen and Frenz (2010) are, to my knowledge, the only two published articles that find a benign impact of file-sharing.
If these two papers are included in the sample of studies when calculating average values of Metric 3, it is still the case that a majority of studies finds that the entire decline is due to file-sharing and the average value of Metric 3 is still a very high 89%. 16
V. Conclusion
Although there have been numerous literature reviews discussing empirical estimates of the impact of file-sharing on sales of sound recordings, none have compared the results on a consistent basis. I have endeavored to fill this lacuna by proposing a simple metric-the share of the sales decline that is explained by file sharing-and translating the empirical results of the literature into that metric. That translation allows a useful comparison of the many efforts to identify the effect of file sharing.
The results indicate that the majority of all studies support a conclusion that the entire decline in sound recording sales can be explained by file-sharing. Even those studies that do not find that file-sharing caused the complete decline usually find that it was responsible for a large share of the decline.
Because this type of comparison has not been previously made, I believe that there has not been a recognition that the literature points to such a strong result. I believe that many interested individuals, many researchers in the area, and even many members of the industry are likely to be surprised that a majority of econometric studies find that the entire decline in sound recording sales that has occurred is due to file-sharing. on the industry that might be overturned if the industry would try to encourage sampling in various venues (although one does have to read the paper fairly carefully to understand some of its conclusions). 16 This value is calculated using the raw results found in the Appendix. then, as an additional test, mixes two inconsistent data sets and gets results similar to 20%. Liebowitz (2006) : The approach in this paper was to examine whether alternative hypotheses could explain any of the decline. He concluded that no alternative explanation held up very well with most being completely rejected by the data. New evidence has further confirmed this conclusion. Thus the entire decline is attributed to file-sharing. Liebowitz (2008) : Liebowitz discusses his results in terms of Metric 3 but only to indicate that more than the entire decline is due to file-sharing (or somewhat more precisely, that Internet activities that promote piracy, which may overstate the effect of organized file-sharing narrowly defined). In Table 1 overall album sales fell by .58 units. In Table 5 , line 5, file-sharing is claimed to have led to a decline of 1.19 units. This works out to almost exactly 200% as the share of the decline that file-sharing was responsible for. Liebowitz calculated that the growth rate in sales implied by his results, in the counterfactual world without file-sharing, was 3.6%, which seemed reasonable given the historical growth of sales in the prior three decades. Michel (2006) : He uses U.S. data through 2003. He found a decline of 13% that he attributes to file-sharing although the cause is likely to be somewhat broader since he doesn't measure file-sharing per se. Unit sales had fallen by 28% at that time, leading to a value of 45% for Metric 3 (13/28). Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) : They used data for 16 large markets from 1998 through 2002. They find a 20% decline in unit sales. Assuming that an average of the U.S. and non-U.S. (based on revenues) would mimic somewhat their sample of countries implies a decline in sales of 16%. This leads to a value for Metric 3 of 125% (20/16) although there is some uncertainty in this construction. Still, their estimate is almost certainly over 100% since the U.S. had an early and very high drop in units the first few years after Napster and its decline was just slightly greater than 20%, giving slightly under 100% as the low end estimate of Metric 3. Rob and Waldfogel (2006) : Although the text discusses their results in terms of Metric 2, they also present a result in terms of Metric 1 in which their OLS estimate translates to a 9% decline in sales in the 2003/2004 period (this can be found on their page 53 ("downloading reduced purchases by individuals in the sample by about 9 percent"). The average sales decline in those two years is about 26% so that Metric 3 is 35% (9/26). Their instrumental variable approach provides an estimate that is four times as large, which thus becomes
